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This paper presents a model of non-cooperative network formation sim-
ilar to Bala and Goyal (2000), except that marginal costs in the size of the
network is increasing. Agents link among each other to gain information
and update their links according to a better reply dynamics. In the long run
the system settles in a state that consists of starred-wheel networks. This
is reminiscent of some real world features. Collections of smaller disjoint
networks connecting few agents are more common than global networks
connecting all agents of the community. Diﬀerences within a connected
component such as core and periphery are established.
Keywords: Networks, coordination, learning dynamics, non-cooperative
games.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A network formation game is presented in this paper. This is a non-cooperative
game among agents who individually decide whether or not to build a link with
some other agent. Economic investigation in network formation and interaction
among networked agents can be divided in two branches. The ￿rst one considers
the network structure exogenous and studies the interaction of linked agents given
the network. Local interaction and peer pressure are examples of interactions
of agents within given networks. This research agenda on ￿static networks￿ was
developed both theoretically and empirically.1 T h es e c o n db r a n c ho fi n v e s t i g a t i o n
focuses on changing networks and adopts a game-theoretic approach to analyse
the dynamic process leading to the formation of the actual network. Jackson [15]
provides a clear and up-to-date overview of this literature.
Game-theorists initially focused on cooperative network formation. The co-
operative feature is the fact that if one agent wants to link to another one then
the former needs the agreement of the latter: i.e. the two must cooperatively
agree on being linked. This literature2 comprises Jackson, Watts ([30], [16] and
[17]), Dutta, van den Nouweland, Slikker and Tijs ([6], [25], [26] and [27]) among
others. The cooperative approach is helpful in many contexts in which is not a
limitation to assume that the agent who receives a link may veto it.
The stream of literature to which this paper belongs was opened by Bala
and Goyal [1] (henceforth BG) who focus on the importance of non-cooperative
incentives for network formation. BG innovate the literature by modelling self-
interested boundedly-rational agents who can unilaterally decide whether to build
or sever a link. Their predictions depend on the relative cost of a link and on
whether information ￿ows in one direction only or in both directions through
the links. In every time period BG￿s agents select the best response given the
current network. It is noteworthy that both with one-way and with two-way
1Within this literature see for example Ellison [7] and Tesfatsion [28] which are theoretical
papers and Bertrand et al. [2], Case and Katz [4] and Ichino and Maggi [14] which are empirical
works.
2For a detailed account of this literature see Jackson [15] and references therein.
2information ￿ow the BG non-empty steady-state networks connect all the agents
in the population.
Goyal, Galeotti, Joshi, Moraga, Vega-Redondo ([10], [11], [12] and [13]), Lar-
rosa and TohmØ ([18]) present applications and extensions of this framework.
Falk and Kosfeld [8] experimentally test BG￿s model both with one-way and with
two-way information ￿ow. The predictions of the one-way ￿ow model can be repli-
cated in the laboratory while those of the two-way ￿ow one cannot.3 Currarini
and Morelli [5] and Mutuswami and Winter [21] develop a mechanism-design
approach to characterise the mechanism achieving eﬃcient networks. Networks,
local and group interactions are of interest in all the social sciences. Historians
for example use networks to analyse behavioural and power relationships among
agents in order to have a better understanding of micro-determinants of historical
events.4
The observation that it is extremely rare that real-world networks connect all
the individuals in a society motivates this research. In fact there are two main
features that arise in the real world. Agents are usually connected locally and
not globally with the whole community. Often they are also partitioned in a core-
periphery dichotomy where agents in the core are usually better oﬀ then those in
the periphery.
This paper develops an extension of BG￿s with one-way information ￿ow. The
homogenous agents in the network bear the cost of the links they sponsor. In
addition each agent pays the network maintenance cost. This is modelled as an
increasing and convex function of the number of observed agents, but it does not
directly depend on the number of sponsored links of each agent. In every period
the agents play the network formation game, each of them with a probability
of maintaining the strategy implemented in the previous period. Active agents
3Falk and Kosfeld [8] observe that fairness considerations (Fehr and Schmidt [9]) may explain
these results. Fairness is de￿ned as inequality aversion, hence BG￿s two-way information ￿ow
equilibria ￿which are (pay-oﬀ) asymmetric￿ are not fairness compatible while equilibria with
one-way information ￿ow are symmetric and hence fairness compatible.
4See Padgett and Ansell [23] and Lipp and Krempel [20] among others.
3change their current strategy only if they switch to another strategy that improves
their current payoﬀ. So the dynamic analysis is based on better response.
The essential diﬀerence between this paper and BG is the presence of the
network maintenance cost. Such a cost makes the marginal cost of every addi-
tional link an increasing function of the total number of observed agents, while
the marginal bene￿t is constant. Hence there exists an optimal number of agents
that each player wants to observe. The network maintenance costs implies that
there are decreasing returns to linking and it can also be interpreted as costs due
to congestion in the network.
The main results are as follows. The dynamics converges in ￿nite time. The
basic component of the absorbing state architecture is a starred wheel where some
agents form a wheel5 and others are linked to the wheel ￿from outside￿. Limit
networks consist of disjoint components each of which is characterised by the fact
that some agents (who are in the wheel at the centre of the network) enjoy a
higher payoﬀ -in fact the maximum payoﬀ attainable- than the peripheral ones.
W h i l ea l lt h eo u t s i d ea g e n t so b s e r v et h ec e n t r a lw h e e l ,t h e yd on o to b s e r v ee a c h
other. The results of this paper are in line with the real world features mentioned
above: limit networks are local rather than global and in the absorbing state
agents are partitioned between a centre and a periphery. All the starred wheels
have the same dimension. This means that the number of agents involved in
the central wheel is the same among the components of the limit network. The
number of peripheral agents connected to each of this wheels may however vary.
Social welfare ￿as measured by the sum of agents￿ payoﬀs￿ increases with the
number of disconnected components in the limit network.
Simple comparison between the limit networks obtained here and those of
BG shows the impact of the introduction of the network maintenance cost. As
we are considering the one-way information ￿ow, let us recall the two networks
that are absorbing states in this case of BG analysis: the (global) wheel and
5Given a (sub)set of agents the wheel is a network that connects all of them, each of whom
has one link to another one and is linked by a third (diﬀerent) one only.
4the empty network.6 The BG dynamics settles to a wheel for low values of the
unitary cost of link and to the empty network for high values of the cost, while
both networks are absorbing states for intermediate values of the cost of a link.
BG analysis is a special case of the model presented in this paper: there are no
network maintenance costs. For a small population size BG results hold even in
presence of network maintenance costs. For any given level of the maintenance
cost, the bigger the population the larger the number of disconnected components
in the limit networks. In addition in BG￿s limit networks all agents receive the
same payoﬀ while central agents in a starred wheel are better oﬀ than peripheral
ones.
Of particular interest is also a comparison of the results of this paper with
those of Galeotti and Goyal [10] since they reach some results which have a sim-
ilar ￿avour building on diﬀerent assumptions to those used here. Galeotti and
Goyal [10] restrict the analysis to the case of two-way information ￿ow and as-
sume that agents are heterogeneous and that their heterogeneity is an observable
characteristic. Their ￿ndings are that limit networks may be either collections
of disconnected components or characterised by an insider-outsider dichotomy.
Galeotti and Goyal [10]￿s results reinforce rather than contradict those presented
here. Total connectedness of the limit network as in BG can be broken in two
manners. With one-way information ￿ow it is suﬃcient to assume a convex cost
for network maintenance maintaining the original assumption of homogeneous
agents as is done in this paper. With two-way information ￿ow one can introduce
exogenous heterogeneity among the individuals as in Galeotti and Goyal [10].
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the model. Sec-
tion 3 provides the preliminary analysis. Section 4 characterises the absorbing
state networks and section 5 concludes. The appendices collect some of the proofs.
6This network is obviously characterised by the absence of any link between any two agents.
52 The Model
There is a population of P agents. With a slight abuse of notation let us indicate
with P both the population and its size. Every agent plays the network formation
game. A strategy of each agent i indicates for all agents jj6= i whether i has a
direct link to j. It is represented with a vector gi =( gi,1,...,g i,i−1,g i,i+1,...,g i,P)
of dimension P − 1, where each element of the vector takes value 1 if i has one
(direct) link to j and 0 otherwise. We say that agent i observes agent jj6= i
if either i built a link to j,i . e . gi,j =1 , or there exists a path in the network
that goes from i to j, i.e. there exists a set of agents {k1,..,k n} ⊂ P such that
gi,k1 = gk1,k2 = ... = gkm,km+1 = ... = gkn,j =1 . We adopt the convention that
every agent always observes himself.
The set of all strategies of each player is Gi = {0,1}
P−1 for i =1 ,...,P.E v e r y
strategy pro￿le translates into a (directed) network. Both a network and the
strategy pro￿le that generates it are indicated with g ∈ G1 ￿ ...￿G P.W ew r i t e
g = gi ⊕ g−i to stress that the network g is made by the composition of the
strategy of i with those of his opponents.
Consider the following example: P =4 , g1 =( 0 ,0,0), g2 =( 0 ,1,0), g3 =
(1,1,0) and g4 =( 0 ,0,1). Agent 1 has no links. Agents 2 and 4 each have one
link only to agent 3. Agent 3 has two links, one with agent 1 and the other with
agent 2. This network is depicted in the ￿gure below. The arrows indicate the




Figure 1: Example of a network
6This is the one-way information ￿ow model of BG.
Let us indicate with c the cost building one link, with µi (g) the number of
agents i is directly or indirectly linked with through the network g (including
agent i himself) and with µd
i (g) the number of links set up by agent i.I n t h e
example of Figure 1 above µ1 =1 , µd
1 =0 , µ2 =2 , µd
2 =1 , µ3 =3 ,µ d
3 =2and
µ4 =4 , µd
4 =1 . Note that the arrows indicate the identity of the agent who is
bearing the cost of the link.
The individual payoﬀ function is a function of the network g which player i
belongs to:
πi (g)=µi (g) − cµ
d
i (g) − α [µi (g)]
2 (1)
The term −α [µi (g)]
2 in the payoﬀ function represents the network mainte-
nance cost. This implies that there are decreasing returns to linking, as the total
cost of a network cµ d
i (g)+α [µi (g)]
2 is increasing and convex in the number of














which is needed to guarantee that agents have incentives to connect. Notice that
in the limit case α =0t h em o d e li st h es a m ea st h a ti nB G .
De￿ne N (i,g) as the set of agents observed by i through the network g.S o
µi (g)=kN (i,g)k i.e. µi (g) is the cardinality of the set N (i,g).D e ￿ne the
geodesic distance between agents i and j in a network gd(i,j;g) as the number
of links on the shortest path from j to i.I fj/ ∈ N (i,g) set d(i,j;g)=+ ∞.G i v e n
an agent i in any network g the agent who is furthest away from i among those
he observes is j := argmax ∈N(i,g) d(i, ;g). Note that i does not need any links
of j to observe any one in N (i,g),o t h e r w i s ej would not be furthest away from i.
For all g in G the set of all networks that are the same as g up to a permutation
of the indexes are called the set of architectures equivalent to g.F i n a l l y d e ￿ne
a network component as a subgraph consisting only of agents that have links to
agents belonging to the same component and who are not observed by any other
agent.
Let us now give the de￿nition of some special network components.
7De￿nition 1 A network component is called a wheel of dimension n if there
exists k1,..,k n with {k1,..,k n} ⊂ P such that gkiki+1 =1for i =1 ,...,n− 1,
gkn,k1 =1and gr,s =0otherwise.
The set of wheels of dimension n is denoted by W (n).






Figure 2: A wheel of dimension 6
In a wheel of dimension n the payoﬀ of each agent belonging to this wheel
equals n − c − αn2.
Another important network component for the analysis of this paper is the
starred wheel. A starred wheel of dimensions n and m consists of n + m agents,
such that n agents are connected in a wheel, with all the further m agents being
directly connected to the central wheel. The n agents who form the wheel are
called the central agents and the other m are the peripheral agents.
De￿nition 2 As t a r r e dw h e e lof dimensions n and m is a network component
connecting n + m agents characterised by the following conditions:
1. each agent only sponsors one link, i.e. µd
i (g)=1for all i;
2. there exists a permutation of n agents k1,...,k n such that gkiki+1 =1for
i =1 ,...,n− 1 and gkn,k1 =1 ;
3. for each j/ ∈ {k1,...,kn} there exists i ∈ {1,...,n} such that gj,ki =1 .
The set of starred wheels of dimensions n and m is denoted by SW(n,m).
8We say a starred wheel of dimension n (omitting the number of peripheral
agents) when it only is important to stress the number of agents forming the
central wheel.
De￿nition 3 A constellation of starred wheels of dimension m is a network which
can be partitioned into components each of which is a (starred) wheel of dimension
m.
Recall that the ￿oor of x is indicated with bxc and is de￿ned as the smallest
integer greater than or equal to x,i . e .bxc =m a x{z ∈ Z : z ≤ x} for all x ∈ R.
Note that a constellation of starred wheels of dimension m can be made of a





and is obtainable from any
permutation of the agents provided that: i) in the network there are only starred
or simple wheels; ii) each wheel has dimension m; iii) all the P agents are linked.









Figure 3: A starred wheel of dimensions 4 and 3
Let us ￿nally de￿ne two special roles that an agent can play in a network g:
the stand-alone and the terminal. A stand-alone is an agent who does not have
any links and is not observed by anyone in the network. A terminal does not
have any links, yet he is observed by someone else in the network.
9De￿nition 4 Agent i is a stand-alone if N (i,g)={i} and i/ ∈ N (j,g) for all
j ∈ P\{i}.
Agent i is a terminal if N (i,g)={i} but i is not a stand-alone, i.e. there exists
k ∈ P\{i} such that i ∈ N (k,g).
Both stand-alones and terminals receive the same payoﬀ: 1 − α.
3 Preliminary Properties
Let us exclude the (zero-measure) case that there exists an integer   such that
α =
1
2 +1,i . e .α is the inverse of an even number. De￿ne then n∗ as the integer
that is closest to
1



























where bxc is the ￿oor of x de￿ned earlier.
Lemma 4 in Appendix A demonstrates that n and n are well de￿ned and
0 <n< n, 0 <n≤ n∗ and n∗ ≤ n for all α and c in R.T h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a
compares the payoﬀ of a stand-alone with that of an agent connected in a network
establishing the incentives to link. The proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 If (α,c) ∈ R then there exist a network g such that πi (g) > 1−α for
some i ∈ P.
Lemma 1 shows that agents have incentives to connect for parameter values
in the set R. Otherwise stand-alones may receive a higher payoﬀ than connected
agents.
10Lemma 2 Let (α,c) ∈ R and m ∈ N.T h e nm −c− αm2 ≥ 1 −α if and only if
m = {n,...,n}.
The proof is given in Appendix A. Lemma 2 also oﬀers an intuitive interpre-
tation of the thresholds n and n: n and n represent respectively the dimension
of the smallest (pro￿table) wheel and of the largest (pro￿table) wheel which any
member has no incentives to break.
Lemma 3 The payoﬀ of an individual i ∈ P is maximal if he belongs to a wheel
of dimension n∗ formally W (n∗) ⊂ {g|arg maxg πi (g)}.
Proof. Note that the payoﬀ of each agent is a decreasing function of the
number of links he builds. Consider agent i. I ti sa l w a y sp a y o ﬀ improving to
observe the same number of agents with less links as πi (g) ≤ kN (i,g)k − c −
αkN (i,g)k
2. If agent i has only one link and observes m agents then i￿s payoﬀ is
the one he would get in a wheel of dimension m,i . e .πi (g)=m−c−αm2.S ow e
can restrict attention to wheel network components. Let us extend the (wheel)
payoﬀ function to the real line: i.e. ϕ(γ): =γ − c − αγ2. It can be easily shown
that the maximum of ϕ(γ) is attained for γ = γ∗ :=
1
2α. The function ϕ(γ) is
symmetric about the axis γ = γ∗, as ϕ(γ)=
1
4α − c − α(γ − γ∗)
2. Hence the
payoﬀ function (1) is maximised in a wheel of dimension n∗ agents where n∗ ∈ N
solves |n∗ − γ∗| ≤ 1
2.
Notice that the central agents of a starred wheel of dimension n∗ enjoy the
maximum payoﬀ. The peripheral ones observe n∗ +1agents with one single
link: they receive the payoﬀ of an agent who belongs to a W (n∗ +1 ) .L e m m a
3 also shows that the decreasing returns to linking equal the marginal bene￿to f
observing one additional agent for µi (g)=n∗.
Let us now de￿ne a Nash network and a strict Nash network. These are
the networks generated by strategy pro￿les that respectively constitutes a Nash
equilibrium and a strict Nash equilibrium of the linking game. Formally:












i ∈ Gi and all i ∈ P.
AN a s hn e t w o r kg∗ is a strict Nash network if equality in equation (3) implies
g0
i = g∗
i for any agent i in the population.
To illustrate the above de￿nitions consider a population of 9 agents. Set
α =
1
10 and c =
3
5,s ot h a t(α,c) ∈ R. Then we obtain that n∗ =5 , n =2and










Figure 4: A Nash equilibrium network
for P =9 , α =
1
10 and c =
3
5
For instance agent 2 is indiﬀerent between connecting to 9 (as depicted) or to
6 and player 3 is indiﬀerent between having a link to 9 (as in the ￿gure) or to 7.
In the rest of the paper we use the following set-wise solution concept.
12De￿nition 6 A non-empty set of pure strategy combinations B ⊆ G1 ￿ ...￿G P
is a pure-strategy strict Nash equilibrium set (PSNES) if for every strategy pro￿le
σ ∈ B, for all i ∈ P and every gi ∈ Gi
πi (σ) ≥ πi (gi ⊕ σ−i)
where equality implies (gi ⊕ σ−i) ∈ B.
This is the restriction to pure strategies of the concept of strict equilibrium
set (Balkenborg [3]).
4 Dynamic Analysis
Building on BG and on Ritzberger and Weibull [24], we now consider the dy-
namics induced when in each round a single random agent is selected who then
chooses among the strategies that make him better oﬀ given that the others do
not change their strategy. Formally,
De￿nition 7 In a network g = gi ⊕ g−i g0
i is a better response to g−i than gi for
i if πi (g0
i ⊕ g−i) ≥ πi (g).
The set of all agent i￿s better responses to g−i is de￿ned as βi (g−i).
In any time period agents observe the network built in the previous periods.
With positive independent probability γi > 0 each agent will exhibit ￿inertia￿, i.e.
will maintain the strategy played in the previous period. With the complementary
probability 1−γi > 0 the agent will play a better response to the current network.












with probability 1 − γi
gt
i with probability γi
(4)
for all agents in the population.7
7See also Maynard Smith and Price [22].
13A limit network of the better reply dynamics (4) can be a steady state or
belong to an absorbing set.
De￿nition 8 An e t w o r k￿ g is steady state of the better reply dynamics (4) if gt
i =
￿ gi implies that g
t+1
i =￿ gi for all i ∈ P.
De￿nition 9 As u b s e tA ⊂ G1 ￿ ...￿G P is an absorbing set of the better reply
dynamics (4) if gt ∈ A implies gt+1 ∈ A.
For the sake of simplicity we restrict to the case in which agents face strong
incentives to connect. Speci￿cally this restriction is used in the following remark.
ASSUMPTION: For (α,c) ∈ R, assume further that 0 <c<1 − 3α.



















Remark 1 If (α,c) ∈ P then n =2which means that no agent has an incentive
to cut all his links in a network in which he observes 2 agents.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Combining the previous remark with Lemma 2 we observe that it is never
payoﬀ maximising to have no links at all if it is possible to observe no more than
n agents with one link.
In the following we ￿rst establish results for the case n∗ ≤ n−1 and a large and
non-pathological population size. Proposition 3 deals with these special cases.









and in addition if n∗ >
1
2α that there exists no integer
k such that P =( k +1 )n∗ − 1. Then a constellation of starred wheels of dimen-
sion n∗ is a PSNES.
Proof. Consider a constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗.G i v e n
the n∗ +m agents who form one SW (n∗,m), none of them wants to individually
deviate in a way that alters the starred wheel architecture. Consider ￿rst the
n∗ agents who form the W (n∗). They obtain the maximum payoﬀ since they
observe n∗ agents and only pay for one link. So they have no incentive to deviate.
Let us now consider the m peripheral agents who are linked to the wheel. None
of them can improve his payoﬀ: if one of them cuts his link and links somewhere
else to the wheel neither his payoﬀ nor the architecture change. If he links to
someone else who is directly linked to the W (n∗) his payoﬀ reduces since now
this agent observes n∗ +2 . If a peripheral agent links somewhere outside the
starred wheel then the starred wheel still exists. He can only increase his payoﬀ
linking (with only one link) to someone who observes n∗ − 1. This is impossible
since the original network was a constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗.
So a constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗ is a PSNES because every
time agents deviate in a way that the resulting architecture is not a constellation
of SN(n∗,m) these agents are worse oﬀ and agents are indiﬀerent only among
strategies that do not alter the architecture.
Let us now analyse the better reply dynamics. The following proposition
proves that the dynamics always converges to a constellation of starred wheels of
dimension n∗ in ￿nite time.











and in addition if n∗ >
1
2α that there exists no integer
k such that P =( k +1 )n∗ − 1.T h e n i n ￿nite time each agent belongs to a
starred wheel of dimension n∗. From then on, while the network might change, it
remains a constellation of starred-wheels of dimension n∗ in each period.
15The proof is given in the Appendix B and contains 6 steps. Starting from
an arbitrary network we ￿rst show that in ￿nite time there will be no connected
agents who observe less than n or more than n agents (Step 1). Secondly we prove
that all the agents in the network either observe someone or they are stand-alones,
so in ￿nite time terminals connect to someone (Step 2). Thirdly also stand-alones
have an incentive to join in the network (Step 3). Hence in ￿nite time the network
is such that all the agents observe a number of agents between n and n.W et h e n
show that starting from such a network in ￿nite time (at least) one agent gets to
observe n∗ agents (Steps 4). Each time someone observes n∗ a starred wheel of
dimension n∗ arises (Step 5). The ￿nal step of proof shows that the absorbing set
of the better reply dynamics is a constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗.
Note that the actual number of starred wheels of dimension n∗ that arise in
the limit state of the dynamics is indeterminate. During the dynamic process a
peripheral agent of a starred wheel might sever his link and join another subset
of agents if by so doing he gets to observe n∗ agents. Then by Proposition 2 the
process that leads to the formation of a new starred wheel begins. This implies
that the better reply dynamics (4) does not converge to a steady state but that a
constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗ is an absorbing state of the better
reply dynamics (4). Notice that BG assume that α =0and c ∈ [0,1].8 In our
set-up this implies that n =1and n∗ =+ ∞. Thus they obtain a global wheel
which is a limit case of the absorbing states found in the above proposition.
Let us now consider the three cases of a pathological population size, of n∗ = n
and of a small population. If n∗ > 1
2α and there exists an integer k such that











if P<n ∗ then the steady state architectures are as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 i) Let P be such that there exist an integer k such that P =
(k +1 )n∗−1 and n∗ >
1
2α. Then with positive probability the better reply dynam-
8BG, Theorem 3.1, Part a), p. 1197.
16ics settles in ￿nite time to a network consisting of k wheels of dimension n∗ and
one wheel of dimension n∗ − 1, which is a steady state.










. If there exist an
integer h such that P =3 h +1then the unique steady state of the better reply
dynamics is a set of h wheels W (3) and the remaining agent is a stand-alone; if
P =3 h +2the unique steady state is a set of h wheels W (3) and the remaining
2a g e n t sf o r maW (2);a n di fP =3 h the unique steady state is a set of h wheels
W (3).
iii) Let P<n ∗ then in ￿nite time the agents form one wheel of dimension P
which is a steady state of the better reply dynamics.
Proof. Part i): assume there are k players who observe k disjoint groups of n∗
agents. This is an event that happens with positive probability. Then k wheels
of dimension n∗ surely arise (applying Step 5.a of the proof of Proposition 2).
Assume that the remaining (n∗ − 1) agents are linked to each other only. Then
they have the choice between forming their own wheel of dimension (n∗ − 1) or
linking (from outside) to the existing wheels of dimension n∗.S i n c en∗ > 1
2α,t h e
payoﬀ of a wheel of dimension (n∗ − 1) is higher than that one can get by linking
to wheel of dimension n∗. Hence they form a wheel W (n∗ − 1).
P a r ti i )I tc a nb ee a s i l yv e r i ￿ed that the assumptions on α and c are equivalent
to the following values for n∗, n and n: n∗ = n =3and n =2which is the only
p o s s i b l ec a s ei nw h i c hn∗ = n for (α,c) ∈ P . We can apply Steps 1, 2, 4 and
5 a. of the proof of Proposition 2 to show that at least one W (3) forms. Once
all the W (3) formed, there will be either 1 or 2 or no remainders. If there are 2
remainders they will form a W (2) as n =2 .
Part iii): Take the agent who is observing the largest number of agents and call
him i1.N o we i t h e ri1 observes the whole population or there exists someone who
is not observed by i1.I nt h e￿rst case apply replacing n∗ with P,t h ea r g u m e n t
o fS t e p5 . ao fP r o p o s i t i o n2t os h o wt h a to n es i m p l ew h e e lo fd i m e n s i o nP forms.
O t h e r w i s et a k ea m o n gt h ea g e n t sn o to b s e r v e db yi1 the one who observes the
most agents and call him j. For him it is payoﬀ improving to cut all his link(s)
and link to i1 directly. So j does and now j is the one who observes most agents
17in P. Repeat the argument until one agent observes all the P agents. Then apply
the argument of Step 5.a. of Proposition 2 (replacing n∗ with P).
The case of Part iii) is not surprising since it is intuitive that every agent is
connected and observes everyone else when the population is small. This means
that a small population size prevents the decreasing returns to linking to prevail
on the marginal bene￿t of observing one additional agent.
Let us concentrate on the absorbing architecture found in Proposition 2. De-
￿ne now r, q ∈ N such that






,i . e .q is the maximum number of starred wheel that can arise. De￿ne
the aggregate payoﬀ of the population as the sum of the payoﬀ of each agent. A
network g is called a Pareto eﬃcient architecture if it is impossible to increase
the payoﬀ of any agent without reducing the payoﬀso fo t h e r s .











and in addition if n∗ >
1
2α that there exists no integer
k such that P =( k +1 )n∗ − 1. Consider the absorbing set found in Proposition
2: the aggregate payoﬀ of the population increases with the number of starred
wheels in the limit architecture. The Pareto eﬃcient architecture consists of q
starred wheels of dimension n∗ with the remaining r agents being linked from
outside to these wheels, where q and r are de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .
Proof. The ￿rst part of the statement is easily veri￿ed. The aggregate payoﬀ
of the population increases with the number of starred wheels as central agents
in a starred wheel of dimension n∗ enjoy the maximum payoﬀ and their number
increases of with the number of starred wheels in the limit architecture.
Let us now prove the second part. Given a constellation of q starred wheels
of dimension n∗ it is impossible to increase the payoﬀ of any agent without re-
ducing that of another one. The n∗ ￿q central agents enjoy the maximum payoﬀ
attainable (by Lemma 3) so there is no way to improve it. Peripheral agents
18observe n∗ +1agents with one single link and receive a lower payoﬀ,t h a to f
the members of a W (n∗ +1 ) . The only way they can improve the payoﬀ is to
reduce by one unit the number of agents observed. This is impossible because
the peripheral players are too few (r<n ∗ by equation 5) to set up a W (n∗) on
their own without reducing the payoﬀ of some central agents.
Notice that the aggregate payoﬀ of the population can be interpreted as the
Social Welfare.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper the eﬀects of network maintenance in the process of network for-
mation are studied as a variant of the model by Bala and Goyal [1]. Network
maintenance which is related to network size aﬀects the payoﬀso ft h ea g e n t si n
a way that dramatically changes the steady state predictions with respect to the
original. The presence of the maintenance cost implies that there are decreasing
returns to linking. The agents who are assumed homogenous have to trade oﬀ not
only the number of links they sponsor with the bene￿t of observing the others.
They also have to consider that larger networks are proportionally more expensive
to maintain than smaller ones. Strategy revision occurs by better response.
In this model the dynamics converges in ￿nite time. Absorbing states are
a constellation of disjoint starred wheels, where core agents are linked in the
optimally-sized wheel and peripheral agents link to the wheel from outside. Simi-
lar architectures of links among economic agents are found in Taiwanese industrial
districts (Lee [19]).
Examples of disjoint networks are much more common in the real world than
global networks. As an illustration consider the furniture industry in Italy: it
is localised in nine major industrial districts which are not located close to each
other, rather than being agglomerated in one single location. Similarly there are
eight major industrial districts in Italy in the textile and apparel sector and nine
19in the leather goods sector9. The result that social welfare increases with network
fragmentation may explain this observation.
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23A Miscellaneous Preliminary Results
Lemma 4 For all (α,c) in the set R we ￿nd that n < n, n ≤ n∗ and n∗ ≤ n.
Proof. Recall that n∗ is de￿ned as the integer that is closest to 1
2α.F o r m a l l y ,










which is positive and well-de￿ned for all positive α as we excluded the zero-
measure case that there exists an integer   such that α =
1
2 +1,i . e .t h a tα is the
















The thresholds n and n are well-de￿ned for α>0 and c ∈
£
0, 1
4α + α − 1
⁄
.




2α > 0 if and only














which holds as (α,c) ∈ R. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 1 If (α,c) ∈ R then there exist a network g such that πi (g) > 1 − α
for some i ∈ P.
Proof. Let a network g contain a wheel of dimension m,i . e . i ng there
exists a subset M of the population such that the agent in M form a wheel
W (m). Consider an agent i who belongs to this wheel. Agent i receives a payoﬀ
πi (g)=m− c−αm2 in the network g. Recall that stand-alones receive a payoﬀ
equal to 1 − α.
24It can be shown that −m2α + m + α − c − 1 > 0 for some m if (α,c) ∈ R.
Let φ(γ): =−αγ2 + γ + α − 1 − c. Consider the equation φ(γ)=0 .I t s




2α . The roots γ1 and γ2 are real number only if
1−4α(c +1− α) ≥ 0,i . e .c ≤
1
4α−1+α.I f1−4α(c +1− α)=0then φ(γ)=0
for γ =
1
2α and φ(γ) < 0 otherwise. So 1 − 4α(c +1− α) > 0 which means that
the parameters belong to the set R de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 )a b o v e .T h es t a t e m e n t
follows as α>0 and hence −m2α + m − c>1 − α if and only if γ1 <m<γ 2.
Notice that Lemma 4 above guarantees the existence of such m.
Lemma 2 Let (α,c) ∈ R and m ∈ N.T h e nm − c − αm2 ≥ 1 − α if and only
if m ∈ {n,...,n}.
Proof. Recall that n = dγ1e and n = bγ2c and that γ1 and γ2 are the
solutions of the equation −αγ2 +γ +α− 1− c =0 .S om−c+αm2 ≥ 1− α for
all m = n,...,n and m − c + αm2 < 1 − α for m<nand m>n.
Remark 1 If (α,c) ∈ P then n =2which means that no agent has an incentive
to cut all his links in a network in which he observes 2 agents.




































Figure A1: The parameter space P






as (1 − 2α)
2 > 1 − 4α +4 α
2 − 4αc
as 0 > −c






if and only if 1 − 4α<
p
1 − 4α(c +1− α)
As α<
1
4 then 1 − 4α>0. So γ1 ≤ 2 if and only if (1 − 4α)
2 ≤ 1 −
4α(c +1− α),i . e . c ≤ 1 − 3α which holds for all α,c ∈ P.S o n =2for all
α,c ∈ P
26B Proof of the Main Results
To prove Proposition 2 we need to establish some preliminary results. The Lem-
mas in the next subsection present some relevant cases in which the better re-
sponse dynamics (4) leads to the emergence of a wheel or of an agent who observes
n∗ players. These are building blocks for the proof of the proposition as we will
show that every time an agent observes n∗ players a starred wheel of dimension
n∗ arises.
B.1 Preparatory Lemmas
Lemma 5 is of some independent interest as it deals with the case of (simple)
wheel formation. It is suﬃcient that an agent is better oﬀ than all those he
observes for a wheel to emerge among these agents.
Lemma 5 Let agent i1 be such that πi1 ≥ πj for all j ∈ N (i1,g), i.e. i1 is best
oﬀ among those he observes. Let m := kN (i1,g)k so m is the number of agents
observed by i1.I f m>1 then in ￿nite time a wheel W (m) arises among the
agents originally in N (i1,g).
Proof. Let M := N (i1,g).C o n s i d e r i2 ∈ argmax ∈M d(i1, ;g) so i2 is
furthest away from i1 among those who are observed by i1.N o t et h a ti1 does not
use any of i2￿s links to observe anyone else. Agent i2 can improve his payoﬀ by
cutting all his links and linking to i1 directly since
πi2 (g) ≤ πi1 (g) ≤ m − c − αm
2
as i2 ∈ N (i1,g).S oh ed o e s .C a l lt h i sn e wn e t w o r kg(2).
Note that now i2 observes all the agents in M (so m) with one single link
and his payoﬀ is exactly m − c − αm2 which is the new maximum payoﬀ in M.
Moreover all the agents who observe i2 now observe all the agents in M.
We proceed by induction. Assume we have done the ￿rst  −1 iterations. Call
agent i  the player who moved in iteration  −1 for  >1.L e tg( ) be the network
27formed at the end of iteration  ,i . e .a f t e ri  moved. Notice that all the agents
who moved in the previous round are consecutively linked to each other, i.e. is
has one single link to agent is−1 for s =2 ,..., . So the distance between i  and i1





￿ = m for s =1 ,..., 
and  >1.C o n s i d e rn o wi +1 ∈ argmaxj∈M d
¡
i ,j;g( )¢
so i +1 is furthest away
from i . By the reasoning applied to i2 agent i +1 has a better reply of cutting
all his links and linking to i  directly.
We now show that eventually i1 is selected, so that a wheel W (m) forms.






for all h>2 eventually i1 is selected as M is ￿nite and the distance between ih
and i1 increases by 1 in each step. Let ik be the last agent who moves before i1
is selected. Notice that ik observes i1 through a path consisting of all the agents
who moved before him. As ik observes m agents and i1 is the furthest away from
ik it follows that k = m.
Notice now that i1 is the only agent in M who can possibly have more than
one link. If so then let i1 play. By the same reasoning as i2 agent i1 has a better
response to cut all his links and link to im.N o wi1 observes m agents with one
single link and closes a wheel of dimension m among the agents i1,...,i m with
possibly other players observing them.
In the proof of Proposition 2 we ￿nd a path of the better reply dynamics that
leads to the formation of a constellation of starred wheels once at least one agent
in the population observes exactly n∗ players. The next Lemmas consider ￿rst
the case of a highly fragmented network and then of a highly connected one. In
particular Lemma 6 assumes that there exist more than n∗ agents who observe
less than n∗ and shows that one of them will observe n∗ agents in ￿nite time.
Lemma 6 If there exist more than n∗ agents each of whom observes between n
and n∗ − 1 agents then in ￿nite time at least one agent who observes exactly
n∗ agents will arise, i.e. the better response dynamics gt is such that for some






28Proof. Consider the assumptions of the Lemma. Call H the set of agents
each of whom observes between n and n∗ − 1 agents in the network g. Notice
that kHk ≥ n∗ +1 .D e ￿ne ￿ P as the subset of the population consisting of
all the agents observed by some h ∈ H,f o r m a l l y ￿ P =
S
h∈H N (h,g).A m o n g
the agents belonging to ￿ P let i1 be an agent who observes the most agents, i.e.
i1 ∈ argmaxj∈ ￿ P kN (j,g)k.L e tm1 := kN (i1,g)k. Note that m1 ≤ n∗ − 1.
Consider i2 ∈ argmax ∈N(i1,g) d(i1, ;g) so i2 is furthest away from i1 among
those who are observed by i1.R e c a l l t h a t i1 does not use any of i2￿s links to
o b s e r v ea n y o n ee l s e .A g e n ti2 can improve his payoﬀ by cutting all his links and
linking to i1 directly since
πi2 (g) ≤ m1 − c − αm
2
1
as i2 ∈ N (i1,g). So he does and receives a payoﬀ exactly equal to m1 −c−αm2
1.
Call this new network g0.N o t et h a tN (i2,g0)=N (i1,g) and that i2 is the
best oﬀ among the agents he observes. So by Lemma 5 the agents observed by i2
form a W (m1).
Call this new network g0. Assume there exist a k ∈ ￿ P\N (ij,g 0) for some
agent ij in the W (m1) such that d(k,ij;g0)=1 ,i . e .a g e n tk is directly linked the
wheel without belonging to it. As m1 ≤ n∗ − 1, agent ij+1 in the W (m1) whose
only link is to ij has a better response to cut his link and link to k.T h i sm a k e s
a wheel of dimension m1 +1 . Repeat until an agent gets to observe n∗ (which
completes the proof) or no such k outside the wheel exists anymore.
In the letter case call the new network ￿ g and m2 the dimension of the (en-
larged) wheel. So m2 ≥ m1. Note that all the agents in ￿ P either belong to the
wheel W (m2) or are not in the wheel and hence observe less than or equal to m1
agents. Call L the subset of ￿ P of agents who do not belong to the wheel
So ￿ P is partitioned into the agents belonging to the wheel W (m2) and those
in L. Each agent   ∈ L has a better response to cut all his links and link directly
to someone who belongs to the wheel as kN ( ,￿ g)k ≤ m2 ≤ n∗−1. By so doing all
the agents in L directly link to the wheel without belonging to it. So we re-apply
the argument developed above for an agent k who is linked the wheel directly





￿ >n ∗ by assumption of the Lemma. This completes the proof.
In the next Lemma we consider the case of a network which is so highly
connected that there exists a subset of the population such that all the agent in
this subset observe more than n∗ agents and all the agents observed by them also
o b s e r v em o r et h a nn∗. We then show that in this case an agent observing exactly
n∗ will emerge.
Lemma 7 Assume there exist an agent k such that n∗ +1≤ kN ( ,g)k ≤ n for
all   ∈ N (k,g), i.e. such that all the agents observed by him observe between
n∗ +1and n agents. Then in ￿nite time at least one agent who observes exactly
n∗ agents will arise.
Proof. Let ￿ P =
S






￿ ≥ n∗ +1since N (i,g) ≥
n∗ +1for all i ∈ ￿ P.C o n s i d e rn o wt h ea g e n tw h oi sb e s to ﬀ in ￿ P and call him i1,
so πi0 (g) ≤ πi1 (g) for all i0 ∈ N (i1,g).L e tm1 = kN (i1,g)k so m1 ≥ n∗ +1 .B y
Lemma 5 the agents in N (i,g) form a wheel W (m1).
Call this new network g0. Take now an agent j belonging to this wheel W (m1).
Agent j has a better response (in fact it is his best response) to cut his link and
link to agent r in the wheel such that d(r,j;g0)=n∗.S oh ed o e sa n do b s e r v e s
exactly n∗ agents improving his payoﬀ. This completes the proof
The following lemma considers another situation in which there is an agent
j1 who observes more than n∗ agent. It assume further that among the agents he
observes all those who observe less than n∗ players observe so few that they have
a better response to cut all their links and link to j1 directly. Once all of them
linked to j1 no-one observed by j1 observes less than n∗. Then by Lemma 7 one
agent who observes n∗ p l a y e r sa r i s e si n￿nite time.
Lemma 8 Assume there exist an agent j1 such that n∗ +1≤ kN (j1,g)k ≤ n
and for each agent   ∈ N (j1,g) such that kN ( ,g)k ≤ n∗ − 1 we have that
kN (j1,g)k + kN ( ,g)k +1<
1
α.T h e n i n ￿nite time at least one agent who
observes exactly n∗ agents will arise.
30Proof. Let m1 := kN (j1,g)k,s om1 is the number of agents observed by
j1.C o n s i d e rj2 ∈ arg max ∈{ ∈N(j1,g): kN( ,g)k<n∗} kN ( ,g)k so j2 is the agent who
observes the maximum number of agents among those observed by j1 who observe
less than n∗.A g e n t j2 exists by assumption of the Lemma. Consider an agent
￿  ∈ arg max ∈N(j2,g) d(j2, ;g) so ￿  is furthest away from j2 among those who are
observed by j2.S okN (￿ ,g)k ≤ kN (j2,g)k ≤ n∗ − 1 and π￿  (g) ≤ kN (￿ ,g)k −
c − αkN (￿ ,g)k
2.N o t i c et h a tm1 + kN (￿ ,g)k +1<
1
α implies that kN (￿ ,g)k −
c − αkN (￿ ,g)k
2 <m 1 − c − αm2
1. Hence it is a better response for ￿  to cut all
his links and link to j1 getting to observe m1 agents. So he does and receives a
payoﬀ equal to m1 − c − αm2
1.
Call this new network g0.N o t i c e t h a t ￿  and all the agents in N (j1,g) who
observed ￿  in g now observe exactly m1 ≥ n∗ +1agents in g0 as they were all
observed by j1 in g. However nothing changed for the other agents observed by
j1.S og0 is identical to g with the exception of the move made by ￿ . In particular
for each agent   ∈ N (j1,g 0) such that kN ( ,g0)k ≤ n∗ − 1 we still have that
kN (j1,g 0)k + kN ( ,g0)k +1<
1
α. We can then replicate this argument until no
agent observes less than n∗.N o wb yL e m m a7a tl e a s to n ep l a y e rw h oo b s e r v e s
exactly n∗ agents emerges. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove the main result of the paper.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2





3 − 15α<c≤ 1
4α − 1
“
and in addition if n∗ > 1
2α that there exists no integer k
such that P =( k +1 )n∗ −1.T h e ni n￿nite time each agent belongs to a starred
wheel of dimension n∗. From then on, while the network might change, it remains
a constellation of starred-wheels of dimension n∗ in each period.
Proof. We ￿nd a path of the better reply dynamics (4) such that starting from
an arbitrary network it leads in ￿nite time to a constellation of starred wheels of
dimension n∗ through the following steps:
1. From an arbitrary network in ￿nite time we eliminate all agents whose
31payoﬀ is less that 1 − α. In the resulting network there are either stand-
alones or terminals or agents who do not observe less than n or more than
n agents.
Proof. Take an arbitrary network g. Consider the set of the agents Q(g)=
{i ∈ P|πi (g) < 1 − α}. Take the agent with the highest index in Q(g) and
call this agent j.S o j has a better response is to cut all his links. Thus
j becomes a stand-alone (or a terminal in the case he was observed by
someone else) and receives 1 − α.
Call this new network g0. For every agent i/ ∈ Q(g) such that j ∈ N (i,g) if j
cuts all his links then πi (g0) ≥ 1−α since n =2 .S okQ(g0)k ≤ kQ(g)k−1.
Replicate this argument until all the agents receive a payoﬀ greater or equal
to 1−α. Then by Lemma 2 all the agents who are neither stand-alones nor
terminals observe between n and n.
2. Let us eliminate from the network the terminals in ￿nite time.
Proof. Consider a terminal agent i.B y d e ￿nition there exists an agent
j ∈ P\{i} who observes i,i . e . i ∈ N (j,g).W e s h o w t h a t i f i links to
j then i is better oﬀ.C a l l t h e n e w n e t w o r k g0.W h e n i links to j then
N (i,g0)=N (j,g) as i was a terminal in g.S i n c e i has only one link in
g0, kN (i,g0)k = kN (j,g)k ≤ n and πj (g) ≥ 1 − α we ￿nd πi (g0) ≥ 1 − α.
Replicate this argument until all terminals connect.
3. We now show that in ￿nite time stand-alones connect.
(a) If there exist an agent i ∈ g such that n ≤ kN (i,g)k ≤ n − 1, i.e. if
there exists an agent i who observes no more than n − 1 a n dn ol e s s
than n then we eliminate all the stand-alone in ￿nite time.
Proof. Any stand-alone has a better response to link to i.B y s o
doing he observes kN (i,g)k+1≤ n and receives a payoﬀ greater than
or equal to 1 − α. Notice that agent i still observes the same agents
as in g.
32(b) If kN (j,g)k = n holds for all j ∈ g such that kN (j,g)k > 1 we
eliminate all the stand-alone in ￿nite time.









is equivalent to n∗ ≤ n − 1 and n =2 .
Let us divide the proof in two cases.
First assume that there exist an agent i such that µd
i (g)=1 ,i . e . i
has only one link. Then i is best oﬀ among all the agents he observes.
S ob yL e m m a5aw h e e lW (n) forms among all the agents in N (i,g).
Call this new network g0. Take now an agent j belonging to this wheel
W (n).A sn∗ ≤ n−1 agent j in the wheel has a better response to cut
his link and link to agent r in the wheel such that d(r, j;g0)=n − 1.
So he does and observes exactly n − 1 agents improving his payoﬀ.
Now we are back to the case considered in part a) of this Step and the
proof is complete.
Second assume that µd
i (g) 6=1for all i. Fix one agent and call him
i1. Consider an agent i2 ∈ argmax ∈N(i1,g) d(i1, ;g) so i2 is furthest
away from i1 among those who are observed by i1. Note that i1 does
not use any of i2￿s links to observe anyone else. Agent i2 improves his
payoﬀ by cutting all his links (which are more than one) and linking
to i1 directly. Now agent i2 has one link only and we are back in the
previous case of part b).
4. Now all the players in the network only observe a number of agents between
n and n. From any such network in ￿nite time a player that observes n∗
agents emerges.
Proof. Take the agent who observes the maximum number of agents i1 ∈
arg maxj∈P kN (j,g)k.T a k ei2 ∈ arg maxj∈{ ∈P: kN( ,g)k<n∗} kN (j,g)k,s oi2
is the agent who observes the maximum number of agents among those
who observe less than n∗.I fi2 does not exist then by Lemma 7 at least one
player who observes exactly n∗ agents will arise. Let m1 := kN (i1,g)k and
m2 := kN (i2,g)k whenever it exists.
33Let us consider the following 3 cases.
(a) Assume that m1 = m2.I n￿nite time one player observing n∗ emerges.
Proof. If m1 = m2 then all the players observe less than n∗ agents
and hence by Lemma 6 at least one player observing exactly n∗ agents
emerges.
(b) Assume that m1 + m2 +1<
1
α and m1 ≥ n∗ +1 .T h e ni n￿nite time
one agent observes exactly n∗ agents.
Proof. Assume ￿rst that some agents who observe less than n∗ are
observed by i1. Note that for all agents j with kN (j,g)k ≤ n∗ − 1
we have kN (j,g)k ≤ m2. In particular for all ￿  ∈ N (i1,g) such that
kN (￿ ,g)k ≤ n∗ − 1 we have that m1 + kN (￿ ,g)k +1< 1
α.S o b y
L e m m a8i n￿nite time at least one player observing exactly n∗ agents
emerges.
If instead for all j such that kN (j,g)k ≤ n∗ − 1 we have j/ ∈ N (i1,g)
then kN (k,g)k ≥ n∗ +1for all agents k ∈ N (i1,g) and hence by
Lemma 7 at least one player who observes exactly n∗ agents will arise.
(c) Assume m1 +m2 +1≥
1
α and m1 ≥ n∗ +1 . To show: one agent that
observes n∗ players will arise in ￿nite time.




￿ ≥ m1 >n ∗.A l s o
note that m1 +m2 +1≥
1
α implies πi1 (g) ≤ m2 +1−c−α(m2 +1 )
2.
So agent i1 has a better response of linking to i2 cutting all his original
links. Let him do it and call the new network g0.
Note that N (i1,g 0)={i1} ∪ N (i2,g) and kN (i1,g 0)k = m2 +1≤ n∗.
If kN (i1,g 0)k = n∗ then the proof is complete. If kN (i1,g 0)k ≤ n∗ −1
then i1 is best oﬀ among the agents in N (i1,g 0). S ob yL e m m a5a
wheel W (m2 +1 )forms with possibly other agents observing it. Call
this new network g00.
We now show that the wheel enlarges so that no agent in ￿ P can be
34directly linked to the (enlarged) wheel and observe less than n∗ overall.
Call this agent i.B yd e ￿nition of i there exists an agent i0 in the wheel
such that d(i,i0;g)=1 .A sm2+1 ≤ n∗−1 agent i00 in the wheel whose
only link is to i0 has a better response to cut his link and link to i.S o
the wheel enlarges by 1. Call this new network g000. Assume further
that i observes some agents who do not belong to the W (m2 +1 ) .
As kN (i,g00)k ≤ n∗ − 1 also kN (i,g000)k ≤ n∗ − 1.N o t i c e t h a t f o r
all j in the wheel we have that N (j,g000)=N (i,g000). In particular
agent i0 who belongs to the wheel W (m2 +1 )is best oﬀ among the
agents in N (i0,g 000) so by Lemma 5 a wheel of dimension kN (i0,g 000)k
forms. Repeat until an agent gets to observe n∗ (which completes the
proof) or no such i linked to the wheel and observing less than n∗
agents overall exists anymore. Call this new network ￿ g and the wheel
dimension ￿ m := kN (i,g000)k.
We now enlarge the wheel further so to partition the agents in ￿ P
into those who belong to the wheel and observe less than n∗players
and those who observe more than n∗ players. So we eliminate all
the agents observing less than n∗ agents who do not belong to the
wheel. Note that in ￿ g if agent j does not belong to the W (￿ m) then
either kN (j, ￿ g)k ≥ n∗ +1or kN (j, ￿ g)k ≤ m2 by de￿nition of m2.S o
kN (j, ￿ g)k ≤ ￿ m whenever kN (j, ￿ g)k ≤ n∗−1 for all j ∈ ￿ P. Take agent
h1 who does not belong to the W (￿ m) such that kN (h1, ￿ g)k ≤ n∗ − 1.
As kN (h1, ￿ g)k < ￿ m and ￿ m ≤ n∗ − 1 then h1 has a better response to
cut all his links and link to the W (￿ m) (from outside). So he does and
observes ￿ m +1agents.
If ￿ m+1=n∗ then the proof is complete. Otherwise take h2 among the
agents not observed by h1 in the new network such that h2 observes
less than n∗. By the same reasoning applied to h1 agent h2 improves
his payoﬀ cutting all his links and linking to h1. Repeat this argument
until either some agent observes n∗ or there exist no agent in the
network who does not belong to the wheel and observes less than
35n∗ players. If some agent observes n∗ then the proof is complete.
Otherwise call ￿ h the last agent who moved and note that he is best oﬀ
a m o n ga l lt h o s eh eo b s e r v e sa sh eo b s e r v e st h em o s ta n ds t i l lo b s e r v e s
less than n∗ players with one link only. So by Lemma 5 a wheel forms
among the agents observed by ￿ h. Call this new network ￿ g and the
(new) wheel dimension ￿ m ≤ n∗ − 1.
Note that in ￿ g all the agents in ￿ P either observe more than n∗ agents
or belong to the wheel W (￿ m) and thus observe ￿ m ≤ n∗ − 1. Take
j0 =a r gm i n h∈{ ∈ ￿ P: kN( ,￿ g)k>n∗}kN (h,￿ g)k.L e tm0 := kN (j0,￿ g)k.
Assume ￿rst ￿ m+m0 +1<
1
α then i1 who belongs to the wheel W (￿ m)
has a better response to cut his only link and link to j0.B ys od o i n gi1
breaks the wheel. As in ￿ g everyone who observed less than n∗ agents
belonged to the wheel W (￿ m) now there exists no agent   ∈ ￿ P such
that kN ( ,￿ g)k <n ∗. So by Lemma 7 one agent observing n∗ agents
surely emerges.
Assume instead ￿ m+m0 +1≥
1
α then j0 cuts all his links and links to
the wheel. By de￿nition of m0 for all j0 ∈ ￿ P with kN (j0,￿ g)k ≥ n∗ we
have that ￿ m+kN (j0, ￿ g)k+1≥
1
α.S oa l lj0 ∈ ￿ P with kN (j0,￿ g)k ≥ n∗







￿ >n ∗ the wheel enlarges to n∗ − ￿ m − 1 (peripheral) agents
and an agent observing n∗ players will arise.
5. Now in the network at least one agent observes n∗ players. In ￿nite time
all the agents in the network observing n∗ players belong to a SW (n∗,m).
Proof. The proof is divided in two parts.
(a) If a player observes n∗ agents then this player belongs to a W (n∗) in
￿nite time.
Proof. By assumption of this Step a player who observes n∗ agents
exists. Take an agent who observes n∗ agents and call him i∗
1,t h a ti s
36kN (i∗
1,g)k = n∗.C o n s i d e r i∗
2 ∈ argmax ∈N(i∗
1,g) d(i∗
1, ;g),i . e . c o n -
sider an agent who is furthest away from i∗
1.W e a l r e a d y k n o w t h a t
then i∗
1 does not use any of i∗
2￿s links to observe anyone else. Agent i∗
2
improves his payoﬀ (in fact it is his best response) by cutting all his
links and linking to i∗
1 directly. So he does.
Call this new network g0.N o wi∗
2 enjoys the maximum payoﬀ attain-
able: he observes n∗ agents paying the cost of one single link and the
maintenance cost of a network of n∗ agents. Notice that i∗
2 is best oﬀ
in N (i∗
2,g 0) and that kN (i∗
2,g 0)k = n∗ s ob yL e m m a5aw h e e lW (n∗)
forms. Replicate this argument until there exist no agents observing
n∗ players who do not belong to a wheel W (n∗).
(b) If all the agents who observe n∗ players belong to a wheel W (n∗) and
there exists an agent who does not belong to a W (n∗) then a starred
wheel of dimension n∗ emerges in ￿nite time.
Proof. Call i the agent who does not belong to a W (n∗).L e tmi :=
kN (i,g)k.N o t et h a tmi 6= n∗.
We claim that agent i has a better response to cut all his links and
link to the wheel from outside since by assumption of the Proposition
if n∗ > 1
2α then there exists no integer d such that P =( d +1 )n∗ − 1.
Assume ￿r s tt h a te i t h e rmi >n ∗ or mi <n ∗ − 1 then πi (g) ≤ n∗ +
1 − c − α(n∗ +1 )
2.S oi has a better response to cut all his links and
to link to a wheel of dimension n∗ forming a starred wheel of the same
dimension.
Assume instead that mi = n∗−1.N o t et h a tn∗−1−c−α(n∗ − 1)
2 R
n∗+1−c−α(n∗ +1 )
2 is equivalent to n∗ R
1
2α.S oi fn∗ ≤
1
2α any agent
observing n∗ − 1 has a better response to link to a W (n∗) forming a
starred wheel of the same dimension. Assume now that n∗ >
1
2α.I f
there exists another agent j who does not observe n∗ then j has a
better response to cut all the links and link to i getting to observe n∗
agents. Then a new wheel will arise by part a) of this Step. If no such
37agent j exists then exists an integer d such that P =( d +1 )n∗ − 1
which is a contradiction.
6. In ￿nite time the better reply dynamics converges to a constellation of h






Proof. By Proposition 1 a constellation of starred wheels of dimension n∗
is a PSNES which is absorbing for the better reply dynamics (4).
This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
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